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Abstract 
In pluralistic legal systems, the regulation of non-state law 
through statute carries the risks associated with codification; 
namely the ossification and distortion of law. This article 
examines the effects of statutory regulation on unwritten 
systems of law in the South African legal context. It argues that 
the constitutional recognition of customary law in South Africa 
has forced the state to legislate in this arena, the most notable 
enactments being the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
120 of 1998 and the Reform of Customary Law of Succession 
and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009. The 
enactments' attempt to align customary law with constitutional 
values have imported significant portions of the common law to 
regulate the customary law of marriage and succession. This 
has resulted in a distortion of customary law to reflect common 
law values and rules. Furthermore, it is argued that significant 
lacunae in the enactments have necessitated litigation and 
resulted in the judiciary playing a significant role in shaping 
customary law. Finally, despite the incorporation of living 
customary law into the enactments, the implementation thereof 
by courts and in practice has – and perhaps inevitably so – 
ossified and distorted portions of the law. Nonetheless, the 
article argues that legislation is critical to regulate customary 
law. It advocates that the shortcomings identified in the article 
are addressed to ensure a more accurate portrayal of 
customary law in legislation and the successful implementation 
thereof. 
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1 Introduction 
In pluralistic legal systems, states often seek to regulate unwritten systems 
of non-state law, such as indigenous or customary law,1 to ensure 
compliance with the overarching legal system. For example, during 
apartheid, the South African state shamelessly used the Black 
Administration Act2 to implement the state agenda of segregation and 
control of the indigenous population.3 The Act was crafted to solidify state 
control rather than reflect actual customary law principles.  
Today, the South African state equally uses legislation to regulate 
customary law matters. While such legislation is not steeped in the racist 
state agenda of the past, it is questionable whether the regulation amounts 
to a codification of customary law with an inevitable ossification and 
distortion of the law. This article analyses the consequences of the statutory 
regulation of customary law through an examination of two of the most 
prominent pieces of legislation dealing with customary law in South Africa, 
namely the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act4 and the Reform of 
Customary Law of Succession Act.5  
The article first explains the need for statutory regulation in light of South 
Africa's constitutional recognition of customary law. It argues that legislation 
seeks to develop customary law to reflect constitutional principles and 
norms though this may not materialise in practice. Legislative developments 
tend to distort customary law as common law concepts are imposed on 
customary law. Ultimately, South African legislation has mixed 
consequences. Nuanced drafting has sought to capture living customary 
law practices but on the other hand poor drafting and significant lacunae in 
legislation have had to be litigated at the expense of mostly women. 
                                            
* Fatima Osman. B BusSci (first class honours) LLB (cum laude) LLM (distinction) 
(UCT). Senior lecturer at the Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town, South 
Africa. E-mail: Fatima.Osman@uct.ac.za.  
1  The terms ʺindigenousʺ and ʺcustomary lawʺ are used interchangeably in South 
African literature and in this article.  
2  Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 (hereafter the Black Administration Act). 
3  Langa CJ in Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) 
para 61 (hereafter Bhe case) described the Act as the ʺcornerstone of racial 
oppression, division and conflict in South Africaʺ that had been specifically 
designed to separate and exclude Africans from the rest of the population. 
4  Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (hereafter Recognition Act). 
5  Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 
11 of 2009 (hereafter Reform Act). 
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2 Constitutional recognition of customary law 
Historically, customary law was not recognised as a valid system of law in 
South Africa.6 Recognition was limited for the purposes of controlling the 
population.7 In terms of the policy of indirect rule, the state used traditional 
leaders and customary law to further the state agenda of segregation and 
control of the population.8 The advent of democracy and adoption of the 
Constitution was thus a pivotal moment for customary law in South Africa.9 
The 1996 South African Constitution10 recognises customary law as a 
system of law in South Africa. Numerous constitutional provisions cement 
the recognition and status of customary law and the rights of individuals to 
have their cultural practices protected.11 This has resulted in the enactment 
of legislation such as the Recognition Act which recognises customary 
marriages on par with civil marriages for the first time in the country. 
Furthermore, section 211(3) of the Constitution mandates South African 
courts to apply customary law where applicable subject to the Constitution 
and legislation that deals specifically therewith. The subjection of customary 
law to the Constitution means that customary law practices are not immune 
from constitutional scrutiny and the legislature must ensure that 
discriminatory customary law practices are struck down. While courts have 
played a prominent role in ensuring customary law practices are 
constitutionally compliant,12 legislation also abolishes discriminatory 
                                            
6  For a discussion of the historical treatment of customary law, see Himonga and 
Nhlapo African Customary Law 3-17; Bennett Customary Law 34-42; Himonga and 
Bosch 2000 SALJ 328; Church 2005 ANZLH E-Journal 94-99; and Rautenbach 
2008 JCL 119-122. 
7  Himonga and Nhlapo African Customary Law 7-9. 
8  Himonga and Nhlapo African Customary Law 7-9; and McClendon White Chief, 
Black Lords 6. 
9  Himonga and Nhlapo African Customary Law 17-20; and Rautenbach 2003 Stell 
LR 107. 
10  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). 
11  Section 9(3) of the Constitution prohibits discrimination on ethnic or social origin 
and culture and is interpreted to confer the right to be governed by the law 
applicable to their particular cultural group. See Himonga and Nhlapo African 
Customary Law 18-19. S 15 provides that nothing in the section prevents legislative 
recognition of marriages concluded under any tradition, religious or personal or 
family law systems. Ss 30 and 31 protect the individual and group right to culture 
respectively. S 39(2) provides for the development of customary law on par with 
common law while s 39(3) recognises, among others, any other rights contained 
in customary law to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill of Rights. Ch 
12 recognises the role of traditional leaders. S 235 provides for the right of self-
determination of any community sharing a common cultural and linguistic heritage. 
12  Bhe case; Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 3 SA 152 (CC) 
(hereafter Gumede); Ramuhovhi v President of the Republic of South Africa 2018 
2 SA 1 (CC) (hereafter Ramuhovhi); and MM v MN 2013 4 SA 415 (CC). 
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practices and regulates customary law. The article examines the 
consequences of such regulation through the prism of the Recognition Act 
and the Reform Act. 
3 Development of customary law in line with constitutional 
values 
Years of state manipulation – and indeed manufacture – of customary law 
conferred power on a select few, typically men at the expense of women 
and children. For example, during apartheid, the state sought to address the 
state-induced land shortage among Black13 individuals by providing that 
Black women did not own land independently but rather administered land 
through their husbands and sons.14 This reduced the pool of eligible land-
owners but was a blow to women's rights.15 Similarly, in matters of 
succession, magistrates who administered customary law estates 
entrenched the principle of male primogeniture – the principle that males 
inherit in a pre-determined order to the exclusion of females.16 This was 
problematic given that customary law succession was broader than mere 
inheritance; it focused on the responsibility of the heir to care for the 
deceased's dependents and allowed females and younger siblings to inherit 
and oral dispositions of property to other family members.17 Nonetheless, 
magistrates in their administration of estates solidified male primogeniture 
as the defining characteristic of customary law succession. The result was 
that opportunistic heirs claimed the inheritance of property shirking any 
concomitant customary law responsibility to care for the deceased's family 
members. This was exemplified in the Bhe case in which the deceased's 
father claimed the property based on male primogeniture and intended to 
                                            
13  During apartheid the South African state racially classified its citizens as "Black", 
"White", "Indian" or "Coloured". The categorisations are distasteful but necessary 
to portray the historical position. 
14  The South African state created the land shortage by confining the majority Black 
population to 13 percent of the land; Osman 2019 J Legal Plur 100; and Weinberg 
2013 Acta Juridica 101-103. The blatant making up of the law was not once off; 
see s 11(3) of the Black Administration Act where the state provided that women 
married according to customary law were minors under the guardianship of their 
husbands. 
15  Osman 2019 J Legal Plur 100. 
16  Bennett Customary Law 335; and Bhe case 593. 
17  For a discussion on the general principles of customary law succession, see 
Rautenbach "Law of Succession and Inheritance" 174; Bekker Seymour’s 
Customary Law 273; Kerr Customary Law of Immovable Property; and Coertze 
Bafokeng Family Law 240. For a discussion of customary dispositions of property, 
see Badejogbin 2014/15 SADC LJ 10. 
F OSMAN PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  5 
sell the property despite the fact that it would leave his granddaughters and 
their mother homeless.  
These distortions of customary law which materialised in practice to the 
detriment of women and children were problematic with the advent of the 
Constitution which explicitly prohibits discrimination based on gender and 
culture.18 The clash was perhaps inevitable and Himonga describes the 
conflict between customary law and human rights as an ʺ established factʺ.19 
Thus, at a very basic level, South African legislative interventions seek to 
develop customary law in line with constitutional values and eradicate 
discriminatory customary law practices. For example, the Recognition Act 
addresses the limitations imposed on women and provides that spouses 
have equal status and capacity ending the minority status of women and the 
impediments to their ownership of property.20 Similarly, the Reform Act 
gives effect to the Constitutional Court's declaration that male primogeniture 
is unconstitutional21 and allows for the equal inheritance by males and 
females.  
While statutory enactments aim to regulate customary practices and bring 
them into line with the Bill of Rights, the oft unanswered question is whether 
legislative changes are effected in practice. Himonga,22 in an insightful 
article, explains the limitations of legislation and judicial decisions to bring 
about change on the ground. First, statutory interventions tend to offer 
complex and foreign solutions that are not always compatible with 
customary law and the context within which it operates.23 Secondly, rights 
are often protected through complex litigation which is inaccessible to most 
people.24 These impediments are best exemplified by the protection offered 
in the Recognition Act to women in polygynous marriages. 
The Recognition Act purports to protect the proprietary rights of women in 
polygynous marriages by requiring men who wish to enter into a polygynous 
marriage to enter into a court-approved contract – referred to as a section 
7(6) contract – regulating the proprietary consequences of the polygynous 
marriage.25 The unlikelihood of men ever concluding such contracts was 
                                            
18  Section 9(3) of the Constitution. 
19  Himonga "Constitutional Rights of Women under Customary Law" 317. 
20  Section 6 of the Recognition Act. The Act also explicitly repeals s 11(3)(b) of the 
Black Administration Act. 
21  Bhe case. 
22  Himonga "Constitutional Rights of Women under Customary Law" 317. 
23  Himonga "Constitutional Rights of Women under Customary Law" 326. 
24  Himonga "Constitutional Rights of Women under Customary Law" 326. 
25  Section 7(6) of the Recognition Act. 
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made clear in 2010 – 10 years after the enactment of the Recognition Act – 
when the Women's Legal Centre found only three such contracts had been 
registered.26 Ignorance of the law and the inaccessibility of the courts and 
legal services all likely impede implementation of the provisions. 
Consequentially, the protection offered by section 7(6) is rendered largely 
superfluous. 
Accordingly, it is questionable whether legislative interventions like the 
Recognition Act and Reform Act change customary practices, such as the 
power relations between spouses and the protection of women's rights.27 
There is a real risk that these enactments remain paper law with limited 
implementation in the lives of those it is meant to regulate.  
Statutory interventions, nonetheless, have an important function. They 
signal the intent of the state which has a responsibility to regulate customary 
law practices and ensure their constitutional compliance. The state cannot 
ignore discriminatory practices or wait for development of practices by 
communities themselves. While such development may be more organic 
and authentic, it is likely to be slow and piecemeal and untenable in the new 
constitutional era. Given the limitations of legislation to effect change, 
however, other measures like educational outreach programmes and the 
incorporation of customary institutions such as the extended family and 
community structures may be necessary for the realisation of rights. These 
measures complement legislation and are not a substitute therefor.  
More importantly, legislation is arguably effective at the interface between 
state and non-state law. For example, the Master's Office currently 
administers the estates of individuals who live according to customary law 
but die without a will.28 Recent empirical research reveals that when officials 
administer estates they adhere to the statutory framework rather than 
customary law principles of succession.29 Similarly, courts enforce the 
statutory provisions regardless of conflicts with customary law. Even if the 
immediate effect of the judgment is limited to the litigants, such judgments 
                                            
26  Women’s Legal Centre Recognition of Customary Marriages 18. 
27  For example, the Recognition Act provides for the registration of customary 
marriages as a means of proving the existence of the marriage and aiding women 
in asserting their marital rights. De Souza, however, discusses how in reality 
registration is often a hindrance to the realisation of rights; De Souza 2013 Acta 
Juridica 239. 
28  Section 1 of the Reform Act. 
29  Himonga and Moore Reform of Customary Marriage 228-273. 
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may also gradually shape the living customary law practices.30 Thus when 
state institutions administer customary law then legislation is an effective 
tool for change. 
In summary, legislation generally develops the law in line with the state 
agenda, which in South Africa is the constitutional rights and values. While 
this may have limited practical impact initially, it changes the implementation 
of the law by formal state institutions which hopefully filters down to lived 
realities.  
4 Distortion of customary law 
The development of customary law in line with constitutional values carries 
with it the undeniable risk of alteration of the law. For example, the 
Recognition Act31 incorporates large amounts of common law,32 such as the 
Matrimonial Property Act33 and Divorce Act,34 to regulate customary law 
marriages. The gravitation towards common law is unsurprising given its 
historical dominance but it inevitably changes the nature of customary law 
marriages. Himonga goes as far as to refer to such marriages as ʺcommon 
law African customary marriageʺ.35 
Some changes, however, are deliberate and meant to develop customary 
law in line with constitutional values. For example, the Recognition Act 
requires parties be over the age of 18 years and the consent of both 
spouses to marry according to customary law.36 These provisions were 
aimed at addressing underage and forced marriages37 and are welcomed 
as necessary developments to protect the rights of women and children. 
On the other hand, some changes may significantly change the nature of 
customary law and bring into question the value of the constitutional 
                                            
30  For example, the Bhe judgment is said to be effectively enforced to the benefit of 
Ms Bhe and her daughters; Himonga "Constitutional Rights of Women under 
Customary Law" 321. 
31  See ss 7(3), 7(5), 8(3), 8(4) and 10(3) for how the Recognition Act incorporates 
common law statutes. 
32  South Africa is a mixed legal system comprising of Roman law, Roman-Dutch law, 
English law and African customary law. While common law usually refers to judge-
made law, it is used in the article to refer to the body of law that draws its values 
from Roman law, Roman-Dutch law and English law in the form of both legislation 
and precedent. 
33  Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. 
34  Divorce Act 70 of 1979. 
35  Himonga 2005 Acta Juridica 84. 
36  Sections 3(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Recognition Act. 
37  SALC Project 90, Discussion Paper 74 52-56, 74-78.  
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recognition of customary law. For example, the Reform Act – which is 
essentially a codification of the Bhe decision – replaces the customary law 
principle of male primogeniture with the common law Intestate Succession 
Act to regulate the devolution of estates. Historically, customary law 
succession focussed on succession to status and the identification of 
successor who could step into the shoes of the deceased and assume the 
deceased's responsibilities.38 The successor inherited the property as an 
ancillary to the assumption of the deceased's status and as a means of 
fulfilling their responsibilities.39 The Black Administration Act changed the 
nature of customary law succession by shifting the focus from the 
assumption of status to the distribution of property and winding up of the 
estate. It allowed heirs to inherit property while discarding any responsibility 
towards the family. The Reform Act as read with the Intestate Succession 
Act consolidates this position and perpetuates the focus on the distribution 
of property. It is silent on customary law issues such as the customary heir's 
duty of support but given the individualised framework adopted, it is unlikely 
that such a duty would be imputed to an heir. Of course, this does not 
preclude the oldest son, outside of the statutory framework, stepping into 
the shoes of the deceased and assuming the ceremonial role as head of the 
household. But any duties or obligations of the household head would not 
be legally enforceable. The devolution of property further cements common 
law individualised notions of ownership of property over broader family 
entitlements to property typical of customary law. The result is that the 
customary law of succession has arguably been replaced with the common 
law. This is problematic given the explicit constitutional recognition and 
protection of customary law and individuals' rights to adhere to their cultural 
practices. 
The distortive changes to customary law are equally reflected in the area of 
marriage. For example, the proprietary consequences of all monogamous 
customary marriages are described in terms of the notions of in community 
and out of community of property.40 This secures the rights of spouses in a 
marriage but overlooks the family entitlements to property that exist in 
customary law. In customary law, the broader family – such as children, 
siblings and grandparents – may have an entitlement to use property often 
                                            
38  Kerr Customary Law of Immovable Property 136; Olivier, Bekker and Olivier 
Indigenous Law 160; Bekker and De Kock 1992 CILSA 368; and Hunter Reaction 
to Conquest 122. 
39  Church and Church 2008 Fundamina 9 
40  Section 7(1) of the Recognition Act as read with the Gumede case. 
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described as family or house property.41 The family head controls the 
property with a duty to manage it in the best interests of the family but does 
not own the property.42 Given the various entitlements of use to such 
property, it should arguably not fall within the joint estate which is exclusively 
owned by the spouses. Having the joint estate subsume family property 
would obliterate the rights of other family members to the property and 
confer on spouses greater rights to the property than they had under 
customary law. The Recognition Act, however, does not explain how the 
joint property regime interacts with the customary law entitlements to 
property, whether certain forms of property are excluded or how rights and 
entitlements to such property are regulated. Little regard is had to whether 
the common law proprietary regime is an appropriate solution for describing 
customary ownership of property or how it fits in the customary law setting. 
In all likelihood, customary notions of house and family property are likely 
to be eradicated over time as joint ownership is enforced by the state and 
other formal institutions. 
The Reform Act and Recognition Act thus reveal an unfortunate 
consequence of statutory regulation in South Africa; customary law is forced 
into a common law mould. The familiarity and dominance of the common 
law, the developed jurisprudence thereon and the difficulty of describing 
customary entitlements to property means that common law is often invoked 
to regulate customary law matters.43 The result, however, is an eradication 
of customary law principles as highly sanitised versions of customary law 
are created and protected. 
5 Lacunae in the legislation 
Both the Recognition Act and Reform Act are the product of years of 
legislative deliberation and consultation.44 Surprisingly, however, there have 
                                            
41  Mbatha 2002 SAJHR 262; and Himonga and Moore Reform of Customary 
Marriage 233. 
42  Bekker Seymour's Customary Law 74-75. 
43  This difficulty in describing customary entitlements to property is exemplified by the 
critique of the Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004 in that it failed to capture the 
family-based nature of land rights; see Claassens and Mnisi 2009 SAJHR 506-
507. A discussion of whether and how customary entitlements to property may be 
described in legislation is beyond the scope of this article. 
44  The South African Law Reform Commission commissioned numerous 
investigations into the best approach to reform the customary law of succession; 
see SALC Project 90, Issue Paper 4; SALC Project 108, Issue Paper 12; SALC 
Project 90, Discussion Paper 93; and SALC Project 90, Report on Conflicts of Law. 
This process of investigation is also discussed in Rautenbach and Du Plessis 2003 
De Jure 20; and Moodley Customary Law of Intestate Succession 73-79. In 2004, 
the SALRC released a report on the responses received and making 
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been glaring lacunae in the Recognition Act which have had to be filled by 
the judiciary. For example, the Recognition Act recognises polygynous 
customary marriages, but the regulation thereof is sparse. As discussed 
previously, the Act requires a husband who wishes to enter into a further 
customary marriage to conclude a court-approved section 7(6) contract 
regulating the proprietary consequences of the marriages. The Act, 
however, does not stipulate the consequences of failing to conclude a 
section 7(6) contract or whether the consent of the first wife is required for 
a subsequent customary marriage, nor does it even simply regulate the 
relationship between wives in a polygynous marriage. The result is that the 
South African judiciary has played a significant role in implementing the 
provisions by deciding that while a section 7(6) contract is not required for 
a second customary marriage, the consent of the first wife is required.45 In 
addition, parties have challenged the constitutionality of several provisions 
such as the proprietary consequences of customary marriages and the 
courts have been called upon to regulate the proprietary consequences of 
customary marriages concluded before the commencement of the Act.46  
In summary, the regulation of customary law in South Africa has not been 
comprehensive despite lengthy preceding deliberations on the 
interventions. Poor drafting has necessitated litigation for the realisation of 
rights which has meant that the judiciary has played a significant role in 
shaping customary law. It underscores the need for better legislation and 
maximisation of the skills and expertise of the legislature rather than an 
over-reliance on the judiciary to correct unconstitutional and vaguely drafted 
legislation. 
6 Accommodation of living customary law 
In literature on customary law, the distinction between official and living 
customary law is well-known.47 Official customary law refers to the written 
                                            
recommendations for reform, see SALRC Project 90, Report on the Customary 
Law of Succession. In respect of marriage, see SALC Project 90, Discussion Paper 
74; and SALC Project 90, Report on Customary Marriages. 
45  MN v MM 2012 4 SA 527 (SCA); and MM v MN 2013 4 SA 415 (CC). Also see 
Palesa v Moleko 2013 4 All SA 166 (GSJ) where the court held that a customary 
marriage concluded during the subsistence of civil marriage is invalid. While s 10(4) 
of the Recognition Act prohibits such marriages, it does not specify the 
consequences of a contravention thereof and courts have interpreted the provision 
to mean that such a marriage is invalid. 
46  Gumede and Ramuhovhi. 
47  Himonga and Bosch 2000 SALJ 319-331; Diala 2017 J Legal Plur 143; Bennett 
'''Official' v 'Living' Customary Law" 138; Sanders 1987 CILSA 405; Himonga and 
Nhlapo African Customary Law 27; and Bekker and Maithufi 1992 JJS 47. The 
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versions of law found in legislation, precedent and books, while living 
customary law on the other hand refers to the actual practices of people.48 
Official versions, however, are often treated with caution given the historical 
distortions effected by the state. Living versions represent a more authentic 
account of people's practices – though not necessarily a constitutionally 
compliant version of the law. The South African Constitution furthermore 
recognises and protects living customary law,49 bringing sharply into 
question how statutory regulation accommodates living customary law.  
The Recognition Act and Reform Act should be lauded as they attempt to 
incorporate living customary law within their provisions. The Recognition Act 
stipulates the requirements for all customary marriages concluded after the 
commencement of the Act; namely parties must be over 18 and consent to 
marry according to customary law and the marriage must be negotiated and 
entered into or celebrated in accordance with customary law.50 Customary 
law is in turn defined as the ʺcustoms and usages traditionally observed 
amongst the indigenous African people of South Africa and which form part 
of the culture of those peopleʺ and is understood to refer to living customary 
law.51 In requiring a marriage to be concluded in accordance with living 
customary law, the Act does not codify the requirements for a customary 
law marriage but rather requires that people comply with living customary 
law, whatever that may be. It accords with the SALRC's recommendation 
that legislation be flexibly drafted to recognise variation between indigenous 
communities in their marriage customs and developments in customary law 
as they occur.52 The Recognition Act thus purports to give effect to living 
customary law rather than comprehensively reduce customary law to 
writing. 
The Reform Act adopts a similar approach in defining beneficiaries for the 
purposes of inheritance with reference to customary law. Distinctive 
                                            
distinction is also widely acknowledged in case law, see Bhe case para 87; and 
Mabena v Letsoalo 1998 2 SA 1068 (T) 1074. 
48  Hamnett Chieftainship and Legitimacy 6; Alexkor Ltd v the Richtersveld 
Community 2004 5 SA 460 (CC) 480 (hereafter Alexkor) para 53 and Bhe case 
paras 86-87; Bennett and Bleazard 2009 Recht in Afrika 1-2; Bennett Customary 
Law 6-7; and Himonga and Nhlapo African Customary Law 33-34. 
49  Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) para 197; 
Alexkor para 52; and Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2009 2 SA 66 (CC) para 46. 
Academics argue that the Constitution protects living customary law; see 
Mwambene 2017 AHRLJ 37; Bennett 2009 Am J Comp L 8; Lehnert 2005 SAJHR 
247; Himonga and Bosch 2000 SALJ 328. 
50  Section 3(1) of the Recognition Act. 
51  Rautenbach 2003 Stell LR 107 fn 8; Mwambene 2017 AHRLJ 39. 
52  SALC Project 90, Report on Customary Marriages 43. 
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customary law practices such as seed raiser arrangements,53 woman-to-
woman marriages54 and customary adoption55 are recognised but the Act 
does not elaborate or explain these practices and their requirements. The 
practices are defined with reference to customary law – similarly defined as 
in the Recognition Act to refer to living customary law56 – which requires an 
examination of how a community understands the practice. This 
incorporation of living customary law positions the Act as a flexible and 
adaptive regulation of customary law rather than a static, codification of 
customary law principles.  
While the incorporation of living customary law practices in both enactments 
is commendable, it has not always resulted in the recognition and 
implementation of living customary law. The ambiguous nature of requiring 
a marriage to be negotiated and entered into or celebrated in accordance 
with customary law has unsurprisingly led to a plethora of cases in recent 
times as parties dispute the requirements of marriage. In some cases, 
courts have embraced the nuanced wording and adopted an almost family 
specific approach as to whether a marriage has been concluded. The court 
examines what the families of the spouses agreed would be required for a 
customary marriage to come into existence. For example, in Mathaba v 
Minister of Home Affairs, there was a dispute regarding the existence of a 
customary marriage on the basis that the handing over of the bride, argued 
to be an essential of a customary marriage, had not taken place.57 The court 
emphasised the need to understand what the families agreed to as being 
necessary for a customary marriage to come into existence rather an 
automatic application of a fixed rule.58 Similarly, in Fanti v Boto, the court 
noted that the families of the spouses have to agree acceptable 
arrangements for the payment of lobolo.59 
On the other hand, some courts in determining the existence of a customary 
marriage gravitate towards official versions of customary law. Courts apply 
a finding from one case with no acknowledgment as to the differences in the 
systems of customary law. For example, in Matlala v Dlamini,60 the court 
                                            
53  Section 2(2)(b) of the Reform Act. 
54  Section 2(2)(c) of the Reform Act. 
55  Definition of "descendant" in the Reform Act.  
56  The Reform Act adopted the definition used in the Recognition Act for the purposes 
of consistency; see Portfolio Committee on Justice and Correctional Services 2008 
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/940. One minor difference is that the 
Reform Act uses the word ʺpeopleʺ while the Recognition Act uses ʺpeoplesʺ. 
57  Mathaba v Minister of Home Affairs 2013 JOL 30820 (GNP). 
58  Mathaba v Minister of Home Affairs 2013 JOL 30820 (GNP) para 17. 
59  Fanti v Boto 2008 5 SA 405 (C) para 23. 
60  Matlala v Dlamini 2010 ZAGPPHC 277 (3 June 2010). 
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applied the finding from Fanti v Boto which dealt with Xhosa customary law 
though neither of the litigants in the Matlala case were isiXhosa. Consonant 
with this approach, some judgments do not even mention the system of 
customary law in question.61 The result is that the variation among systems 
is glossed over and customary law distorted as the practices of one 
community are transposed onto another. Customary law is treated – like the 
common law – as a single system of law undermining the rich nuances of 
the law. Thus, despite the Recognition Act anticipating that individuals 
would comply with the requirements of their respective communities, a 
standard set of requirements for marriage has emerged; namely, family 
participation, the negotiation of lobolo and handing over of the bride.62  
However, it is problematic where judgments are viewed as binding 
precedent rather than sources of law. It would mean that a court's finding 
sets the requirements of a marriage rather than the practices of the 
community. The further indiscriminate application of precedent risks 
distorting the law and hindering the recognition of developments in 
customary law. For example, the recent high-profile case of Sengadi v 
Tsambo was criticised for not strictly requiring the handing over of the bride 
as set in precedent.63 The critique never considered whether the community 
and family themselves dispensed with this requirement and reflects the 
tendency to anchor the requirements of marriage in precedent rather than 
recognising developing customary law practices. 
Unfortunately, the court's approach of favouring official customary law in the 
form of precedent and the resultant distortion of the law comes as no 
surprise and was exemplified in the implementation of the Black 
Administration Act. In the pre-constitutional era, the Black Administration 
Act regulated the devolution of estates of Black individuals who died without 
a will and provided among others, that ʺall other movable property devolved 
in accordance with Black law and customʺ. ʺBlack law and customʺ was not 
defined and there was no explicit reference to the principle of male 
primogeniture in the provisions. This meant that magistrates, responsible 
for the administration of estates, could have recognised living customary 
law practices of succession; giving effect to variation in practices among 
groups and recognising developments in the law. Magistrates were further 
                                            
61  Maluleke v Minister of Home Affairs 2008 JDR 0426 (T); and Sengadi v Tsambo 
2018 JDR 2151 (GJ). 
62  Bakker 2018 PELJ 2. 
63  Senake 2018 https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/sundayworld/lifestyle/talk/2018-11-
13-judge-got-it-all-wrong-in-sengadi-tsambos-cas. 
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empowered to hold an enquiry to determine the rightful heir when it was in 
dispute and give directions as to the distribution of the property.64  
Despite the potential for the recognition of living customary law in the broad 
and flexible wording in the Black Administration Act, magistrates and courts 
glossed over the variation and evolving nature of customary law and 
assumed the principle of male primogeniture represented customary law 
succession.65 The statutory provisions were interpreted and applied as a 
rigid rule that property devolved in accordance with the principle of male 
primogeniture without any investigation as to whether the principle had 
evolved or was applied differently in a community.66 Even where the 
statutory provisions expressly allowed for a deviation from customary law, 
male primogeniture was still given effect to. For example, the regulations to 
the Black Administration Act empowered the Minister to make an equitable 
distribution of property, where customary law would have an inappropriate 
or inequitable outcome.67 However, the Ministerial discretion was rarely 
exercised68 even where it appeared appropriate. For example, in Mthembu 
v Letsela69 the litigant and her child were urban dwellers who were not 
maintained by the customary heir, being the deceased's father, who claimed 
the estate based on customary law and sought to eject the litigant and her 
child from their home. Maithufi notes that the application of customary law 
appeared inequitable, but the Minister did not exercise the discretion and 
the property devolved in accordance with male primogeniture.70 
The experience of the Reform Act, on the other hand, has been vastly 
different thus far. There are no reported cases on the Reform Act and courts 
have not been called upon to adjudicate upon customary law practices such 
as seed raiser arrangements, woman-to-woman marriages and customary 
adoption. The lack of litigation may be due to several reasons. Estates are 
administered at the Master's Office and the practices may be recognised at 
the Master's Office with no need for court involvement. Litigation is also 
costly and beyond the reach of many ordinary South Africans. Thus, the 
lack of litigation should not be equated with the effectiveness of the 
                                            
64  SALC Project 90, Discussion Paper 95 11. 
65  SALC Project 90, Discussion Paper 95 11. 
66  Mbatha 2002 SAJHR 260. 
67  Regulation 2(d) of GN R200 of in GG 10601 of 6 February 1987 (Regulations for 
the Administration and Distribution of the Estates of Deceased Blacks). The 
regulations were amended by GN R1501 in GG 24120 of 3 December 2002 
(Amendment of the Regulations for the Administration and Distribution of Estates). 
68  Kerr Customary Law of Immovable Property 235. 
69  Mthembu v Letsela 1997 2 SA 936 (T). 
70  Maithufi 2002 De Jure 207 220. 
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legislation. Furthermore, the practices, while recognised in the Act, may not 
be common across South Africa. In this regard, Himonga and Moore's71 
recent empirical research on customary law succession in South Africa 
found little to no evidence of such practices rendering the value and 
usefulness of such recognition questionable.  
In light of the above, it is apparent that the flexible and innovative drafting 
of legislation is not sufficient for the recognition of living customary law. 
Given the ambiguity the incorporation of living customary law introduces into 
a statute, litigation is to be expected. Thus, the judiciary plays an important 
role in ensuring the implementation of nuanced regulation and avoiding the 
ossification and distortion of the law. Greater attention must be paid to the 
implementation of the law and courts must be directed to judiciously 
recognise and promote the development of living customary law.  
7 Conclusion 
In South Africa, the constitutional recognition of customary law as an equal 
to common law spurred regulation of the law. The state has two pressing 
interests in such regulation. First, to correct years of non-recognition and 
distortion visited upon customary law during the apartheid and colonial eras. 
Second, to ensure customary law practices are constitutionally compliant 
and discriminatory practices struck down. The Recognition Act and the 
Reform Act are the two most prominent pieces of legislation in the South 
African context and the article analysed the consequences thereof to extract 
lessons for further legislative attempts. 
Legislation is most frequently used to regulate customary law in line with 
constitutional values. The article acknowledges historical critiques of the 
effectiveness of legislation in this regard but nonetheless advocates for such 
legislation. Legislation is vital to signal the intent of the state and alternative 
measures should be viewed as complementary rather than as a substitute 
therefor. In addition, legislative interventions are effected by formal state 
institutions, such as courts and the Master's Office, which have increasing 
interactions with customary law. Such implementation is likely to impact 
lived realities, albeit gradually. Accordingly, legislation is a critical 
intervention and states should focus on improving the implementation 
thereof. 
                                            
71  Himonga and Moore Reform of Customary Marriage 228-273. 
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Unfortunately, the Recognition Act and Reform Act manifest the most 
egregious problems with statutory regulation; namely, moulding customary 
law into a common law construct. In regulating customary law, both 
enactments draw heavily on the common law, fundamentally changing the 
nature of the customary law of marriage and succession. Nuances in 
customary law, such as the layered entitlements to use of property, are 
glossed over. This overlooks the value of customary law as a system of law 
and reflects the dated prejudice that the common law is an ideal to be 
emulated. In this regard, statutory regulation must be cautious of the 
importation of common law rules and values. Moreover, in a South African 
context, it undermines the constitutional recognition of customary law. 
Recognition is hollow if statutes simply seek to impose common law to 
regulate customary law matters. While development of customary law is 
undeniably necessary, it is still customary law that should be accentuated 
and reflected in these statutes. This does not deny that where customary 
law practices are discriminatory, they must be struck down. Rather 
customary law must be developed where possible and when struck down, 
the solutions proffered to fill the lacunae must reflect customary law values 
and principles. 
More surprising in the South African context, is the significant lacunae found 
in the Recognition Act. Over the last several years, litigants have challenged 
the proprietary consequences of marriage and sought clarity on matters 
related to polygynous marriages. Poor, Black women have for the most part 
shouldered the costs of vague and ambiguous drafting as women have had 
to increasingly rely upon courts for the realisation of their rights. This sounds 
a warning bell that further enactments should be precise and clear and not 
rely upon the most vulnerable in society to create a jurisprudence thereon. 
Finally, the South African enactments are to be commended for the 
incorporation of living customary law. Neither statute purports to codify 
customary law marriage or succession by reducing its principles to writing 
as fixed and rigid rules. Rather they regulate customary law practices and 
define practices with reference to living customary law, which remains 
subject to the Constitution.72 While this introduces ambiguity and has 
resulted in significant disputes regarding the existence of a customary 
marriage, the uncertainty is a result of the recognition of the variable nature 
of customary law rather than poor and vague drafting, and should be 
embraced. The legislature and judiciary should seek to give effect to the 
                                            
72  Section 211(3) of the Constitution provides that customary law is subject to the 
Constitution and legislation that specifically deals therewith. 
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nuances and variation as it is part of the law's richness and it should not be 
eradicated through rigid rules and precedent. 
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